How to survive the Trump era (and America's decline)
Following the inauguration of Donald Trump, the Apocalypse did not break out, but the rhetoric of divine wrath certainly did. Instead of adopting the comforting words or the distinct tones of Washington, Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Kennedy or Reagan, Trump's inaugural address contained expressions such as "carnage", "people of God" and "virtuous people". He didn't look so much like Andrew Jackson, the populist president of the 1830s to whom his supporters compare him, he looked more like the Puritan theologian Jonathan Edwards preaching his terrifying sermon "Sinners in the Hands of an Wrathful God."
For Trump, of course, the "sinners" are not the adulterers and idlers that Edwards had in mind. It is companies, national adversaries and foreign leaders who have rejected the idea of "America first". In short, they are the establishment. Under the eyes of four of Trump's five living predecessors - Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama - the newly elected termed their legacy imbued with sheer greed, self-referentiality, and the corruption of an entrenched Washington elite which had impoverished American citizens and brought the US to the brink of ruin.
It was not a mere continuation of Trump's incendiary rhetoric during the election campaign. He immediately began to eviscerate the political legacy of his predecessors. His first executive order targeted Obamacare, threatening to leave 18 million Americans without health care within a year (and possibly wreaking havoc among many of his own voters). In the following days, he signed executive orders to have the US withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), re-launch the Obama-rejected pipelines, build a wall on the Mexican border, and cut funds for family planning in developing countries. development. He has also moved to incentivize a special force to expel illegal immigrants and has envisaged the possibility of restoring secret prisons and the torture of suspects for terrorism. He even proposed reversing US efforts to fight AIDS in Africa (an initiative of George W. Bush).
And Trump isn't just keeping his promises. He is also persevering in lies. The Orwellian term "alternative facts" readily entered the American political lexicon after his first busy day in office, when Trump and his highest advisers, embodying the spirit of the Marx Brothers, accused reporters of deliberately underestimating the crowd present at the induction ceremony. On the second day, he repeated to congressional leaders his post-election lie that millions of illegal votes would deny him a popular majority by supporting his opponent, Hillary Clinton - and demanded an official investigation into fraud that even the his own lawyers have declared non-existent.
Trump and his Republican supporters in Congress are taking steps to oversee far more important facts, escalating what he calls his "never-ending war with the media," and more threateningly, banning public agencies from communicating with the public - or even to collect data - on climate change, discrimination in the real estate sector and much more. He seems determined to use presidential power to elevate "royal hyperbole" - the creed extolled in his 1989 autobiography "Trump. The art of doing business "- a government ethics.
But transforming mendacity into national politics is the formula to create, and not to stop, the "carnage", and not only at home. After all, in a crisis, what sane world leader would take Trump at his word?
According to Project Syndicate commentators, now the central issue of our time is to anticipate and mitigate the destabilizing impact of the Trump administration around the world. A result of fundamental importance, in their opinion, is already certain: in the world order that Trump will abandon, America will not be in first place.
Anti-global America
"America first," observes Princeton University historian Harold James, denotes an idea with an ancient - and disturbing - pedigree. "The nationalist spirit of Trump's inaugural speech - observes James - echoed the isolationism advocated by racist aviator Charles Lindbergh, who, as spokesman for the America First Committee, lobbied to keep the US out of World War II". Similarly, Trump's speech "renounced the country's historic role in creating and sustaining the postwar order." While his "objection to a global America is not new - James rightly emphasizes - certainly hearing it from an American president is."
Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and former Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio are alarmed by the possible global impact of this vision. "America first - according to Fischer - signals the renunciation, and the possible destruction, of the US-led world order that the Democratic and Republican presidents, starting with Franklin D. Roosevelt, have built and maintained, with more or less success, for over seven decades ".
In Palacio's opinion, by proclaiming the "right of all nations to put their interests first," Trump intends to "turn the clock back" on the postwar "rules-based system". His vision, according to Palacio, implies a return to the "spheres of influence of the nineteenth century, in the world order where the major players such as the USA, Russia, China and, yes, Germany, each dominated their own sphere within a system international increasingly Balkanized ».
Richard Haass, president of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, agrees. Trump's worldview, in his opinion, is "somewhat incompatible" with the international cooperation needed today to address the world's most pressing problems. If Trump's doctrine of America first and foremost "continues to be the US approach - argues Haass - progress towards building the kind of order that today's interconnected world requires will only happen thanks to the commitment of other great powers; otherwise, we will have to wait for Trump's successor ». This outcome, however, "would be a fallback and would only worsen the situation in the United States and the rest of the world".
May Day for the special report
The possibility of damaging vital American relations was revealed with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto who abruptly canceled an official visit in the wake of Trump's order to start construction on the border wall. By contrast, British Prime Minister Theresa May, the first foreign leader to meet Trump at the White House, appears intent on cementing ties with the new administration.
As noted by Dominique Moisi of the Institut Montaigne in Paris, beyond sharing the "mistrust of Europe", they form an unexpected couple. May "believes in free trade and distrusts Russia, while Trump calls for protectionism and intends to forge a special partnership" with the Kremlin. Yet, in embracing a clear break from the European Union since the Brexit referendum last June, May, too, "seems to be driven by domestic politics to prioritize national sovereignty over the economy." In fact, "your reasoning about the British people is no different from what Russian President Vladimir Putin says to his citizens: you don't live on bread alone, and relaunching national sovereignty and greatness is worth the economic risk."
Philippe Legrain, former economic consultant to the president of the EU Commission, is not surprised by May's choice of "a Brexit variant in which the UK leaves both the EU single market and its customs union" and not just because "it knows little the economy, let alone take care of it ". Like Moisi, Legrain believes his "ultimate goal is to survive as prime minister." From May's perspective, "controlling immigration - a longtime personal obsession - will allow her to ingratiate herself with the 'Leave' voters" while "ending the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain will placate the nationalists of her Party conservative ". Such a position fits in with Trump's nationalist world view of having given May even more incentive to leave the EU after more than four decades.
"May declares that Brexit will allow the UK to conclude better trade deals with non-EU countries - continues Legrain - and is pinning her hopes on a quick agreement with Trump's America". According to Legrain, however, there will be a rude awakening: given the "desperate negotiating position of Great Britain, even an administration led by Hillary Clinton would have imposed very harsh conditions in favor of American industry". And he notes, "US drug companies, for example, want the UK's already cash-strapped NHS to pay more for drugs." More generally, the simple fact that "like China and Germany, Britain exports far more to America than it matters to the US" will weaken May's position. "Trump hates this type of 'unfair' trade deficit - points out Legrain - and has promised to eliminate them."
Former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt wonders "if the UK’s pursuit of a bilateral agreement with the US is just an economic one, or if it implies a broader change in British foreign policy." In fact, Verhofstadt, who will be the European Parliament's chief negotiator for Brexit once May's divorce process is formally triggered (most likely in March), suggests that "Trump's Eurosceptic team is influencing" his approach. By betting "on an alliance with an unpopular, inexperienced and mendacious American president for the future of his country - writes Verhofstadt - the May government is showing short-sightedness and is playing with fire". After all, “the vast majority of British trade is with the EU, not the US; and that, like the UK's geographic location and security, will not change. '
Destroy the Peace Pads
On the last point - the defense of the world's democracies - Verhofstadt, like other Project Syndicate commentators, has clear ideas. "Now that the Trump presidency has questioned US security guarantees - he explains - the United Kingdom and the EU should forge a strategic partnership to guarantee European security" and "must defend and promote liberal democratic values at the level global, and not embrace the narcissistic nationalism of the populists ”. Iain Conn, CEO of Centrica (parent company of British Gas), similarly believes that "it is more important than ever that advanced democracies sit around the same table", not just to address current and future global problems, as Haass suggests. , but also to safeguard one's own safety. "We must protect the bonds that unite - says Conn - and place our future hopes in shared alliances and traditions".
The question is whether the democracies of the world will be able to strengthen ties by struggling to manage crises that will most likely erupt in the absence of American leadership. According to Fischer, Germany and Japan "will be among the biggest losers if the US with Trump abdicates its global role". Since "total defeat in 1945 - he observes, both countries - have rejected all forms of Machtstaat, or the 'state of power'", embracing the role of "active participants in the US-led international system". But their ability to reinvent and sustain themselves as peaceful trading countries has always been based on the "US security umbrella."
If that umbrella were removed, continues Fischer, "Japan's peripheral geopolitical position could, in theory, allow it to re-nationalize its defense capabilities" although this "could significantly increase the likelihood of a military confrontation with the 'East Asia', a particularly alarming scenario 'given that several countries in the region have nuclear weapons'. Compared to Japan, however, "Germany cannot re-nationalize its security policy even in theory, because a step of this kind would compromise the principle of collective defense of Europe". And as Fischer reminds us, that principle, integrating «the former enemy powers so that there are no dangers for one or the other», has been fundamental for maintaining peace in Europe.
It's not just post-war security agreements that are at stake. Trump has questioned two major diplomatic achievements in recent years: the Iranian nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement. "If the US withdraws from one of these agreements, or if they do not fulfill them - explains Javier Solana, former NATO national secretary and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs - they will deal a severe blow to the global governance system based on multilateral agreements. to solve international problems ".
For Haass, "cooperation on climate change - it could be - the manifestation par excellence of globalization, because all countries are exposed to its effects, regardless of their respective contributions". The climate-saving pact signed in Paris, "in which governments agreed to limit emissions and mobilize resources to allow even the poorest countries to adapt - observes Haass - was a step in the right direction".
Trump is the first American president in more than twenty years to begin his mandate without worrying about Iran secretly crossing the nuclear proliferation threshold
But the collapse of the nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPO), poses an immediate threat. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Solana notes, states that the Iranian authorities have allowed her to "inspect every single installation the agency has requested to see, including those that had been denied entry before of the agreement, and guaranteed access to the electronic systems and the enrichment plant to the inspectors ”. Solana cites a report from the International Crisis Group: "Trump is the first American president in more than twenty years to begin his mandate without worrying about Iran secretly crossing the nuclear proliferation threshold."
However, this conclusion, while well founded and widely shared, does not necessarily contradict the "alternative facts" of the Trump administration. In this case, Solana argues, the US, withdrawing from the JCPOA instead of "contributing to regional stability", would risk causing a "far worse nightmare" in the Middle East. According to Solana, there are already "Saudi Arabia which intends to put an end to military intervention in Yemen", "Iran which begins the campaign for the presidential elections" and "Turkey which seeks a solution to the Syrian conflict in line with its policy on the Kurds ”. Meanwhile, "Russia must withdraw its troops from Syria, an intervention that has drained its economy". All these actors, as well as the EU - which, Solana points out, "has yet to resolve the refugee crisis" - would be destabilized by the effects of nuclear uncertainty and the possibility of an arms race in the Middle East.
Moscow on the Potomac?
Perhaps the only foreign policy issue in which Trump's instincts might prove correct, albeit for the wrong reasons, is the Russian-American relationship that he himself is bent on taking to a higher level. Robert Harvey, author and former member of the British Parliament, points out that "Russia has generally complied with arms control agreements with the US" and does not have "the economic and industrial power to support any long-term war action." But he is still skeptical. "George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair initially saw Putin as a man they could do business with," he notes. "But now that he has been in power for 17 years, Putin has shown himself as a venal and violent leader" who "has poured the Cold War tactics on internal dissidents and foreign targets."
Still, New School's Nina Khrushcheva, certainly not a Putin apologist, thinks Trump may still stumble on the right policy. "Putin's immediate goal is to reveal the double standard of the West," says Khrushcheva, for example, "by breaking down Western barriers to the pursuit of Russian interests." And he hopes that the obvious affinity between Trump and Putin will somehow lead the US to "conceive a solid, prudent and calibrated approach towards Russia, an approach that appeals to values not as propaganda, but as the basis of a clearer and more credible foreign policy ”.
Like Harvey and Khrushcheva, economic historian Robert Skidelsky also focuses on the impact that NATO's eastward expansion into Central Europe and the former Soviet Baltic states will have on Russia. Skidelsky is also highly critical of the Putin regime and of "human rights abuses, assassinations, dirty tricks and criminal proceedings to intimidate political opponents." That said, he believes that "the authoritarian and anti-liberal Russia of today is as much the product of the tightening of relations with the West as of Russian history or the threat of disintegration that Russia faced in the 1990s."
Skidelsky borrows a thesis from Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin. "The West - he says - should fear Russia's weakness more than her imperialist projects". Harvey also believes that "Russia's position today is even less secure than it was in the 1980s, when the weakened economy of the Soviet Union could no longer hold control of a buffer zone in Eastern Europe and satellite areas. in other areas ". While, however, Harvey believes that "Putin's economic incompetence will soon present the bill" and that the West must wait until that happens, Skidelsky sees "no reason why a relationship that works cannot be stabilized. better".
The West should fear Russia's weakness more than its imperialist projects
There are three reasons, according to Skidelsky. The first: "Putin's foreign policy blows, however opportunistic, were cautious". The second: "With American power in decline and Chinese power on the rise, a restructuring of international relations is inevitable"; and the third: "Russia could play a constructive role in this review process, if she does not overestimate her strength." And, again taking up Harvey's vision here, Skidelsky points out that "Russia has demonstrated" in the nuclear pact with Iran and in the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons "that it can work with the US to pursue common interests".
But for Carl Bildt, former Swedish prime minister and foreign minister, there are several reasons to be wary of any rapprochement with Russia. To begin with, while Skidelsky sees Putin as a cautious leader, Bildt sees him as a shrewd figure. "Whenever the opportunity arises - observes Bildt - the Kremlin is ready to use all the means at its disposal to take back what it considers its property". Even without "a definite and comprehensive plan to restore the empire," writes Bildt, Putin "undoubtedly has a clear inclination to make imperialist advances whenever the risk is reasonable, as happened in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014" .
Moreover, Khrushcheva and Skidelsky are wrong, according to Bildt, to question the enlargement of NATO. "The expansion of both NATO and the European Union to include the countries of central Europe and the Baltic countries has been fundamental for European security," insists Bildt. "In any other scenario, we would probably already be stuck in a deeply dangerous power struggle with a revanchist Russia claiming the lost territories." And he continues: "Russia will come to terms with itself only if the West firmly supports the independence of these countries for a long period of time". In this case, "Russia will realize that it is in its own long-term interest to break this historical pattern, focus on domestic development, and establish peaceful and respectful relations with its neighbors."
China first of all
Perhaps the most dangerous foreign policy turnaround that Trump seems to want to undertake is the US position vis-à-vis China. Christopher Hill, former US Deputy Secretary of State, notes that Trump seems to have "come to the conclusion that the best way to subvert China's strategic position is to review all past conventions, including the 'One China' policy" . Similarly, Stephen Roach of Yale University, former president of Morgan Stanley Asia, believes Trump is "contemplating a wide range of economic and political sanctions, from imposing punitive tariffs and labeling China as' manipulative currency 'to an approach to Taiwan ».
Both Hill and Roach predict strategic failure if the US pursues this approach. While the Trump administration's "anti-China preconceptions" "are unprecedented in modern history," Roach notes, its strategy "is based on the mistaken belief that an America back in strength has all the power to confront his alleged opponent, and that any Chinese response deserves no consideration ». But, according to Hill, "China is not a subcontractor on a construction project and has the necessary means to lobby the new US administration."
Roach explains it clearly: if the US "persists with the threats, China is to be expected to respond by applying sanctions to American companies operating there, and ultimately with tariffs on American imports, quite trivial considerations for a US economy. devoid of growth ". China may also become "significantly less interested in buying Treasury debt, and this is a potentially serious problem, given the large federal budget deficits that could occur with Trumponomics."
Even excluding such outcomes, Trump clearly seems to have begun his mandate by disarming the main instruments of American influence in Asia, namely those deriving from America's postwar security guarantees and its management of the multilateral institutions that have nurtured global economic openness. And, given its protectionism and the renunciation of the TPP, it is likely that China will end up assuming the regional hegemony that several American presidents, both Republicans and Democrats, have opposed.
Global leadership may not be too far off. As Palacio points out, Chinese President Xi Jinping, who first spoke at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting earlier this month, is "now the champion of globalization." South African political strategist Daniel Silke goes even further. "The rise of China has provided a new orbit for many countries around the world - especially for developing and emerging economies," Silke notes, and his "exceptional diplomatic skills across the African continent (and always more in Southeast Asia) have made it an alternative hegemonic force ». As the United States pulls out and squanders its soft power (e.g. by cutting development aid), China will gain "new opportunities to cement its role as a provider of investments and all sorts of infrastructure and assistance. to a series of countries eager to develop ”.
China is not a subcontractor in a construction project and has the necessary means to put pressure on the new American administration
But while Silke sees a China that is "eager to find a niche of soft-power in which it can assert itself and receive support," Indian strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney sees only the coldness of strategic realism. Chinese leaders have become extremely adept at "using economic tools to favor the geostrategic interests of their country," says Chellaney, in order "to create a hegemonic synosphere on the front of trade, communication, transport and connections for safety". To do this, the Chinese government is ingeniously "integrating its foreign, economic and security policies." If strategically relevant developing countries "are states to take on heavy debts, their financial woes will only help China's neocolonial plans."
Pax Asiana?
What if Asian countries manage to oppose China's hegemonic projects at a time when Trump questions America's commitments in the region? Anne-Marie Slaughter of New America and Mira Rapp-Hooper of the Center for a New American Security provide us with an analysis to reflect on. "Many Asian countries, through deep and predictable political involvement with the US, have grown reassured by America's commitment to their security," they note. "And compared to multilateral security agreements such as NATO, America's Asian alliances are based on single bilateral pacts", leaving them "particularly vulnerable to Trump's vicissitudes."
Instead of "slipping into despair", Slaughter and Rapp-Hooper continue, "America's Asian allies should take matters into their own hands and start networking." Creating a resilient regional security architecture has never before been a top priority, especially thanks to those bilateral security guarantees offered by the United States. "By creating and institutionalizing links between them - according to Slaughter and Rapp-Hooper - US allies in Asia can reshape their regional security network from a US-centric star to a network model, in which they are connected to each other. the other as they are with the United States ». This would give them "a system capable of strengthening stability for uncertain times."
But it would also be a long-term commitment. In the short term, the stability of Asia will be in the hands of Trump, who, according to Joseph Nye of Harvard, should be wary of "two major pitfalls that history has in store for him." One is the so-called Thucydides trap, named after the ancient Greek historian of the Peloponnesian War, according to which "cataclysmic warfare can break out when an established power (such as the United States) becomes too intimidated by a rising power. (like China) ". The other, Nye asserts, is the "Kindleberger trap", named after Charles Kindleberger, which "argued that the disastrous decade of the 1930s erupted when the US replaced Britain as the major global power, but failed to assume the role of the British in providing global public goods ”.
A problem for the world today is that Trump must be afraid of a China that is too weak and too strong
In other words, instead of being too strong, China may be too weak for global leadership. "Under pressure and isolated by Trump's politics - asks Nye - will China be able to become a disruptive free rider able to push the world into a Kindleberger trap?" According to Nye, in the 1930s, the trap - caused by the free riding of the United States - contributed to the "collapse of the global system which resulted in depression, genocide and world war".
So, a problem for the world today is that Trump "must be afraid of a China that is both too weak and too strong." But another perhaps far more serious fear stems from the fact that, given Trump's stubborn ignorance and incorrigible indiscipline, neither Thucydides' trap nor Kindleberger's trap will ultimately count. As Nye acknowledges, wars are often "caused not by impersonal forces, but by bad decisions made in difficult circumstances." In order to evade strategic traps, concludes Nye, Trump "must avoid the miscalculations, preconceptions and impulsive judgments that plague human history."
Is Trump really capable of doing this? Judging from his first six days in office, his presidency itself appears to be a long parade of human shortcomings of this kind. And on the seventh day he certainly won't rest.
