What the hell does Trump want to do with Iran?
Three-year history of aggressive and unpredictable strategies, to try to make sense of it (which some think is not there)
The killing of the powerful Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, carried out by the United States in the night between Thursday and Friday with a drone launch at Baghdad International Airport (Iraq), is the most reckless move made so far by US President Donald Trump against the 'Iran. The Iranian government has called it an "act of war" and has threatened to retaliate, although for now it is not known how far they will be and whether they will cause a new conflict.
It is not clear what Trump's strategy is: yesterday the American president repeated that he did not want to start a war with Iran, but with his actions he could go so far as to provoke it. What is known is that Trump is not new to unpredictable decisions in foreign policy: during his presidency he has shown on several occasions that he has confused and contradictory ideas, even towards Iran, a country that is an enemy of the United States but with which the United States, at least formally, is not at war.
To understand how we got to this point, we need to go back to May 8, 2018, the day when Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Iranian nuclear deal. That decision caused a sudden increase in tension between the two countries and since then American policy in Iran has been a series of decisions that cannot be explained by a precise strategy, but only by the general objective of weakening the Iranian regime and its actions at the same time. abroad, and distancing oneself from the more relaxed and diplomatic approach adopted in previous years by Barack Obama.
The American withdrawal from the nuclear deal, when it all started
The Iranian nuclear deal, defined by many as "historians", was wanted and signed by Trump's predecessor, Barack Obama, and was based on an exchange: Iran would reduce its ability to enrich uranium, depriving itself of the possibility of building the nuclear bomb, while the United States and other signatory countries would have removed some of the sanctions imposed in previous years.
It was the result of an enormous diplomatic effort, begun several years earlier and developed on the idea that an Iran willing to cooperate, therefore not excessively hostile, would allow the international community to curb the possible construction of the nuclear bomb, keeping the plants under control and the Iranian power plants. The agreement was also intended to reduce the tension between the United States and Iran, which has existed between the two countries since 1979, the year of the Khomeinist Revolution, which had transformed Iran into an Islamic Republic hostile to the West.
Trump had already been critical of the agreement during the 2016 election campaign: he and most of the US conservatives believed that the agreement was not favorable enough for the United States and thought that the removal of the sanctions would only strengthen the Iran, which would have had more money to invest in its missile programs and in its aggression campaigns in other Middle Eastern countries, such as those carried out by General Suleimani.
It is important to remember that when Trump announced the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 8, 2018, Iran had not committed any substantial violations of the terms of the treaty. If anything, it was Trump, who had decided to unilaterally reintroduce the sanctions removed three years earlier, to violate the agreement. And that made the Iranians very angry.
A new nuclear deal or regime change in Iran?
Even today it is not clear why Trump decided to make that move, very unusual in international politics, where states tend to keep their commitments despite changes in government.
It was then said that Trump had been conditioned by his more conservative advisors and his more hardline allies (such as Saudi Arabia and Israel), that he wanted to undermine Obama's political legacy, and that he really thought the deal was disadvantageous to the United States. Many wondered what was the ultimate goal of that move: was it to force the Iranian government to negotiate a new nuclear deal, as the US government has repeatedly said? Or to press for a "regime change" in Iran to remove the most radical clerics from power, as suggested by some administration advisers, such as the then National Security Advisor John Bolton?
Congratulations to all involved in eliminating Qassem Soleimani. Long in the making, this was a decisive blow against Iran's malign Quds Force activities worldwide. Hope this is the first step to regime change in Tehran.
— John Bolton (@AmbJohnBolton) January 3, 2020
A tweet from John Bolton - recent, on January 3, published after the killing of Suleimani - which ends by saying: "I hope this is the first step towards regime change in Tehran"
In the months that followed, Trump's decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal began to produce its first significant effects, some of which seemingly contradict the US government's intention to weaken Iran's more conservative forces.
On the one hand, the reintroduction of US sanctions began to have direct consequences on the Iranian economy, in particular by making it difficult to sell oil, and it made it very complicated for European countries to comply with their part of the agreement (the matter is explained at length here). . From this point of view, Trump's policy - which pushed for the "maximum isolation" of Iran - seemed to work.
The problem, however, is that the United States' withdrawal of the agreement had changed the balance in Iranian politics: it had weakened that part of the regime that the agreement had negotiated and wanted, that is, the more moderate faction led by President Hassan Rohuani, and he had strengthened the more conservative elites, those opposed to coming to terms with the West, that is the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards themselves, the military body to which Suleimani belonged.
In other words: Trump's decision had not given rise to new conservative forces, nor had it revolutionized Iranian politics, which for forty years had been particularly hostile towards the West: it had, however, restored strength to the more aggressive and extremist factions, which in the wake of enthusiasm for reaching the nuclear deal had lost consensus.
Even then new doubts about Trump's approach emerged. With the strengthening of the ultraconservative faction, the hypothesis of reopening nuclear talks became increasingly impossible, and at the same time the idea of regime change did not seem viable. In the second half of 2019, the situation worsened further and a new long phase of crisis began that led to talk of the possible start of a war.
The attacks in the Persian Gulf and the problem of military disengagement
Starting in the summer of 2019, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards began carrying out various attacks on foreign oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, the stretch of sea that divides the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman. They hijacked ships and crews, violated the 2015 nuclear deal for the first time and shot down an American drone, causing a furious reaction from the United States.
On June 20, Trump announced that he had approved and then canceled at the last second a military operation against Iran that should have been a retaliation against the shooting down of the drone. In a completely unusual way for a president of such a powerful country, Trump explained on Twitter that he had changed his mind because "a general" had told him that 150 people could have died from the launch of the missile, a toll too high for those circumstances. .
The explanation was not entirely convincing, and according to the American newspapers there were other reasons that prompted Trump to change his mind: for example the pressure exerted on him by the more prudent members of his administration, and the skepticism towards the attack expressed by Tucker Carlson , a regular guest on Fox News, virtually the only American news channel that treats the president in a benevolent manner (and is said to have some influence on him).
Trump was again accused of not having a strategy on Iran and of failing to give continuity and coherence to his policies, allowing himself to be excessively influenced by the most influential adviser or military at the time.
The United States paid for its uncertainty about Iran in Syria as well, where it maintained a small military contingent with the aim of ensuring the definitive defeat of ISIS and curbing the ever-growing Iranian presence in the country, guaranteed by the action of the Revolutionary Guards and of the special corps led by Suleimani. The thing that worried the US government most was the Iranian intention to create a kind of "corridor" between Iran and southern Lebanon, passing through Iraq and Syria - a project that if implemented would greatly strengthen the influence and Iranian power in this piece of the Middle East.
Driven by the desire to withdraw American soldiers from Syria, as he promised to do in the election campaign and during his first years of presidency, and at the same time by the need to maintain a military presence, between the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019 Trump made contradictory statements about what would be the next steps of the United States: first he announced, to the amazement of adversaries and allies, that the American military would leave Syria within 30 days; then, a month later, he took a step back, announcing new conditions for the withdrawal, which effectively slowed him down and downsized.
The issue of the withdrawal of American soldiers from Syria and the whole Middle East, very dear to Trump, continues to be at the center of the debate even today. After the killing of Suleimani, the US government announced the sending of more soldiers to the region, to respond adequately to a possible retaliation from Iran.
Why kill Suleimani, and why right now?
The developments of the last few days have created even more confusion. Many have wondered why Trump decided to order the killing of Suleimani, especially when the two presidents before him had refused to do so for fear of the start of a new war. Also, why right now?
The US government claimed that Suleimani was preparing attacks on US targets in Lebanon and Iraq, but has so far provided no evidence of his claims and an NBC News investigation showed that US lawmakers were unaware of any imminent and outside threats. from the ordinary coming from Iran.
According to sources consulted by the American press, Trump's decision to kill Suleimani was made last week after the killing of an American contractor at an Iraqi military base during a bombing by the pro-Iranian militia Kataib Hezbollah. However, it is not clear what weight the siege of the US embassy in Baghdad, carried out by pro-Iranian Shiite militias between Tuesday and Wednesday of this week, played a role.
The most widespread interpretation is that the killing of Suleimani was the result of the progressive escalation of tension between Iran and the United States in the last year and a half, and of the increasingly aggressive and violent actions carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, especially in Iraq. . What is not clear, however, is whether the United States has a strategy to respond to any Iranian retaliation and whether it is able to keep the situation under control so much that it does not lead to an even more violent conflict with Iran.
According to various experts, Trump may have underestimated the risks deriving from the killing of Suleimani, for example by not considering the Thursday night operation "an act of war". As Douglas Silliman, American ambassador to Iraq until last winter, told the New Yorker, the killing of Suleimani could be compared to the hypothetical killing of the commander of US military operations in the Middle East and North Africa (Centcom). What would the US do if a foreign country killed Centcom's commander-in-chief? The US government would most likely speak of "an act of war", just as Iran did on Friday (and as Trump refused to do).
The point is that it is not clear how Suleimani's death can contribute in any way to achieving Trump's goals.
The US attack attracted a great deal of criticism even among Iranian moderates and reformers, that is, those forces that in Iranian politics try to balance the power of the ultraconservatives. The impression is that the developments of recent days have definitively destroyed any hope of reopening a dialogue on Iranian nuclear power and have strengthened the position of those who hold the most powerful positions in the complicated Iranian institutional structure, i.e. the most radical and most hostile factions. to any change.
Negar Mortazavi, the Independent correspondent and an expert on Iran, wrote: “Remember: Trump withdrew from the Iranian nuclear treaty against virtually everyone’s opinion. He said the deal wasn't good enough and that he would find a better one, because he was the best negotiator around. Well, he didn't get a new deal, he got a new war. ' Ali Vaez, Iran expert at the International Crisis Group, wrote, referring instead to strengthening the Iranian ultraconservatives at the expense of the moderates: "Trump seems to have managed to achieve regime change, but not of the kind he expected."
Some thoughts on #Soleimani's assassination [Thread] pic.twitter.com/RdZGKVyTMD
— Ali Vaez (@AliVaez) January 3, 2020
